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MAINTENANCE AND REPAIRS OF
COOPERATIVE APARTMENTS: RIGHTS AND
REMEDIES OF TENANT-SHAREHOLDERS
I. Introduction
Imagine you have recently made a substantial, cash down pay-
ment on a $175,000 two-bedroom cooperative apartment on the top
floor of an attractive building in Manhattan.' Building security
seems to be adequate, your quarters are spacious, and your neigh-
bors appear to be respectable and reasonable. A few months later,
however, your delight with your new home is somewhat diminished
when you discover a small crack in the ceiling that leaks when it
rains. You put in a request to an officer of the building cooperative
corporation for rectification of the problem. No one repairs your leak
and the condition worsens. You and cooperative officials bicker over
how extensive a repair job is necessary and what the cost would be.
Only those on your floor seem to care at all about the problem
because only they are immediately affected by the leaky roof. The
other people in the building look unfavorably on a major repair that
would raise their maintenance charges. Meanwhile, your interior
walls and personal property are increasingly subject to damage dur-
ing further rainstorms. You call the local housing agency whose
inspectors note numerous violations relating to inadequate refuse
disposal, fire hazards and the lack of proper lighting in the hallways,
as well as the leak in your apartment. No action having been taken
on your requested repairs, you stop making your monthly payments
to the cooperative corporation. The corporation has now brought a
summary proceeding in housing court to evict you and obtain pay-
ments due. What is your best defense against the corporation?
Generally, today's apartment dweller has greater power than ever
before to compel his landlord to provide adequate maintenance and
repair services. A tenant may be entitled to withhold all or part of
his rental payments if his requests for these reasonably expected
services are not heeded. Additionally, he may be able to raise the
1. Recent listings show moderate-sized apartments of this description have this approxi-
mate asking price. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1979, § 8, at 26-29. Real estate industry
spokesmen estimate the per room price in Manhattan's luxury buildings at $34,000. N.Y.
Times, Sept. 23, 1979, § 8, at 1, col. 4.
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landlord's nonperformance as a defense to any resultant eviction
proceeding Underlying the tenant's recently improved position is
a progression of common law landlord-tenant principles and the
enactment of new statutory rights and remedies within the last
decade.' The furthest progression has been embodied in the com-
mon law principle of implied warranty of habitability of the leased
premises, which has been generally liberalized and codified in New
York in section 235-b of the Real Property Law.4
It is unclear whether these developing concepts provide protection
to a cooperator.5 A cooperator holds stock in the cooperative corpo-
ration which owns the building and leases his apartment in the
building from the corporation. The layman ordinarily speaks of
"buying" and "owning" a "co-op," but actually no fee interest is
ever conveyed to any individual inhabitant.' Yet despite the lease-
hold nature of the interest, if the cooperator's apartment at some
point requires extensive repairs, or if there has merely been a stop-
page of normal maintenance service in the building, he may find
himself as alone in his responsibility to keep his dwelling livable as
is any fee owner of a home. The civil court, which has original
jurisdiction over all housing matters in New York City,7 has recently
been divided on the issue of whether to impose upon the cooperative
corporation the duty to maintain the premises in habitable condi-
tion. Two decisions arising from fact patterns substantially similar
to the hypothetical offered above have reached conflicting results,
one decision denying a cooperator a defense under the warranty and
upholding the corporation's right to a summary proceeding; the
other upholding a cooperator's claim under the warranty. ' No appel-
late court has yet reviewed this issue. -
2. See notes 65-88 infra and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 925 (1970); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970).
4. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 235-b (McKinney Supp. 1979).
5. The terms "cooperator" and "tenant-shareholder" will be used interchangeably to
describe a cooperative apartment dweller.
6. N.Y. Times, March 4, 1979, § 8, at 1, col. 3.
7. N.Y. CITY CiV. CT. AcT § 110 (McKinney Supp. 1979). See generally Note, The New
York City Housing Court: Consolidation of Old and New Remedies, 47 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
483 (1973), for a description of this court's purview.
8. Compare 320-E. 57th Corp. v. DeLulio, No. 59269/78 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct., Jan. 10, 1979)
with Hauptman v. 222 E. 80th St. Corp., 418 N.Y.S.2d 728 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1979). For a
discussion of the cases, see notes 130-33 infra and accompanying text.
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This Note will first outline a tenant's remedies where the landlord
has failed to keep the premises, common areas or both in adequate
condition. Second, to aid in determining whether a cooperator
ought to have tenants' remedies available, this Note will examine
the legal relationship .between a cooperative corporation and its
individual cooperators10 Because these advantageous remedies are
often unavailable to cooperative apartment dwellers, this Note will
explore other existing courses of action open to the disgruntled coop-
erator."
II. Modern Residential Tenants' Remedies
A. Development of the Common Law
Traditionally, a lease was deemed merely a conveyance of an
interest in land.'" Until recently, the common law recognized no
duty in the landlord, absent an express promise in the lease to the
contrary, to provide for the maintenance of dwelling space. 3 The
rule of caveat emptor was strictly applied. The landlord was deemed
to have made no warranty that the demised property was fit for any
particular purpose or, if it were a dwelling, that it was a habitable
space.'4 Furthermore, payment of rent was in no way contingent
upon the landlord's continued maintenance of the building. Not-
withstanding the breach of a covenant in the lease, the tenant could
not withhold payment. Rather, the tenant was forced to bring a
separate action to enforce the promise. 5 Simply stated, the tenant
paid for the right of possession of the premises.
This common law rule was an outgrowth of the typical leasehold
arrangement, the agricultural land lease, and, as such, made emi-
9. See pt. II infra.
10. See pt. III infra.
11. See pt. IV infra.
12. Originally, conveyance of a leasehold estate merely gave the tenant the right to claim
possession (Gorcher v. Keteltas, 3 Hill 330 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842)), but now statute requires
that the landlord actually deliver possession to the tenant. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 223-a
(McKinney 1968).
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, LANDLORD-TENANT § 5.1, Comment b (1973).
14. But note, the common law recognized an exception to this rule in the case of a short-
term lease of furnished premises for immediate occupancy. See, e.g., Lemle v. Breeden, 51
Haw. 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Ingalls v. Hobbs, 156 Mass. 348, 31 N.E. 286, 16 L.R.A. 51
(1892); Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 490, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
15. C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 70 (1962).
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nent sense. Agrarian tenants -merely wanted exclusive possession of
a piece of land for a period of years with no landlord interference;
such tenants had the skill and desire to effect the repair of any
defect left by the landlord on the land.'I When applied to city apart-
ments, however, the separation of rental payments on the one hand,
and the condition of the premises on the other, was a grotesque
departure from logic. Apartment dwellers in major urban centers
did not think of themselves as paying merely for the cubicles of air
space they leased. Rather, urban tenants view a leasehold as offer-
ing space and an identifiable package of services. 7 The courts have
recently begun to acknowledge this reality. In the late nineteen-
sixties and early nineteen-seventies, a surging flood of tenants'
rights cases washed over the banks of the old common law of real
property, leaving a rich silt in which a growing garden of tenants'
rights and remedies is cultivated today.' 8
The first direct assault on the traditional landlord-tenant princi-
ples was Javins v. First National Realty Corp.'" in the District of
Columbia. The landlord sought possession of the leased premises on
the grounds that the appellants (tenants) had failed to pay rent.
The tenants alleged approximately 1,500 violations of the Housing
Regulations of the District of Columbia as an equitable defense or
a set-off against the claim for rent.'" The court of appeals reviewed
the traditional approach to landlord-tenant law which, the court
indicated, ignored the logical distinction between agrarian uses and
modern urban uses.2' The court recognized that a city dweller seeks
"a well known package of goods and services-a package which
includes not merely walls and a ceiling, but also adequate heat, light
and ventilation, serviceable plumbing facilities, secure windows and
doors, proper sanitation, and proper maintenance."2 Approving the
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, LANDLORD-TENANT § 5.1, Comment b (1973).
17. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
925 (1970).
18. The hardships that were visited upon tenants under the obsolescent rules of old
landlord/tenant law have been fully described. See, e.g., Quinn & Phillips, The Law of
Landlord-Tenant: A Critical Evaluation of the Past with Guidelines for the Future, 38
FORDHAM L. REV. 225 (1969); Schoshinski, Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: Proposal for
Change, 54 GEO. L.J. 519 (1966).
19. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
20. Id. at 1073.
21. Id. at 1074. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
22. 428 F.2d at 1074 (footnote omitted).
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recent trend toward applying the principles of contract law to
leases,13 the court found it imperative to impose on the leasing of
apartments a kind of implied warranty of fitness similar to that
which sales of goods are subject, in order to make the law consis-
tent."4 The tenant was reasonable in expecting that the apartment
be fit for habitation throughout the specified term of the lease, or,
as in the sales analogue, "fit for the ordinary purposes" 5 for which
it was used. The court held that the local housing code determined
the components of "fitness," or habitability. 6 Thus, the minimum
basic entitlements of tenants were fairly well defined.
The proper remedy to be applied is less easily described. The
Javins court's reliance on contract theory" suggests the use of
contract-type remedies for a breach of the warranty of habitability.
Such remedies include specific performance, rescission and restitu-
tion, and money damages. 28 Damages could consist of (1) the
amount of diminution of market or use value to the tenant of the
premises during the term2' or (2) the amount the tenant himself
spends to restore the premises to a habitable state" (the so-called
"repair and deduct" principle) or both.
In Marini v. Ireland31 the New Jersey Supreme Court addressed
the issue of the "repair and deduct" remedy.3 2 The court hield that
the tenant's expenditure on repairs the landlord failed to make con-
stituted a good defense in a dispossess action 33 and that the "repair
and deduct" method was an appropriate remedy in set-off.31
23. Id. at 1075.
24. See N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-314(1) (McKinney 1964).
25. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c) (McKinney 1964).
26. 428 F.2d at 1081.
27. Id. at 1080.
28. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 326 (1932).
29. Id. § 329, Comment b.
30. Id. § 347.
31. 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970), This case was a dispossess proceeding in which the
tenant had deducted from a monthly rental payment the amount she spent to repair a cracked
toilet. She had had this work done after having made numerous attempts to have the landlord
see to the problem. Id. at 134-35, 265 A.2d at 528. The court emphasized that the landlord,
as well as delivering possession of a habitable space, will have an affirmative duty to keep
the premises in fit condition: "It is a mere matter of semantics whether we designate this
covenant one 'to repair' or 'of habitability and livability fitness.' "Id. at 144, 265 A.2d at 534.
32. Id. at 135, 265 A.2d at 528.
33. Id. at 140, 265 A.2d at 531.
34. Id. at 146, 265 A.2d at 535.
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Soon thereafter, lower New York courts followed the reasoning of
Javins and Marini where landlords failed to correct flagrant viola-
tions of New York's Multiple Dwelling Law35 and the New York City
housing code. 36 Amanuensis, Ltd. v. Brown37 was the first case in
which the implied warranty doctrine was accepted in the civil court,
New York County. The court exercised caution in invoking the new
doctrine by explaining that building security was so inadequate that
it was clear the landlord had a "design. . .to force the tenants to
leave by permitting the violations to continue and the living condi-
tions to become increasingly onerous."3" Subsequent cases in New
York adopted the Javins position that the existing local housing
code would provide the standard for habitability in all residential
leases.3 Amanuensis is instructive on the issue of the appropriate
remedies. Specific performance, which presumably would have
meant an order to install more secure doors and windows, was not
decreed, probably because of the court's traditional wariness of pro-
mulgating an affirmative order which would require judicial super-
vision.' 0 A rescission remedy, in the sense of the lease terminating
and the tenant vacating, was not to the tena'nt's advantage because
of the tight urban housing market." Instead, damages were awarded
to the tenant to be set off from rent payable in proportion to the
35. N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW §§ 1-366 (McKinney 1974 & Supp. 1978).
36. NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE ch. 26, tit. D (1977 & Supp. 1978).
37. 65 Misc. 2d 15, 318 N.Y.S.2d 11 (Civ. Ct. 1971).
38. Id. at 16-17, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 14. The front door to the building had been broken for
several months. Drug addicts took advantage of the open, unguarded entrance and began to
use the building as a gathering place, a "shooting gallery." Id. at 17, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 14-15.
39. Mannie Joseph, Inc. v. Stewart, 71 Misc. 2d 160, 335 N.Y.S.2d 709 (Civ. Ct. 1972);
Morbeth Realty Corp. v. Rosenshine, 67 Misc. 2d 325, 323 N.Y.S.2d 363 (Civ. Ct. 1971). In
the wake of these early cases, tenants' advocates encouraged tenants to act boldly in demand-
ing landlord performance of maintenance and repairs. See generally J. STRIKER & A. SHAPIRO,
SUPER TENANT (1st ed. 1973). But a commentator affiliated with MFY Legal Services, a
pioneer group on this frontier of the law, cautioned against a tenant's unilateral withholding
of rent in response to a perceived breach of duty by the landlord. At that stage of the law's
development a tenant might have been quickly evicted. LeBlanc, Book Review, 2 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 173 (1973).
40. 11 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1422A, at 760-62 (3d ed. 1968); RESTATEMENT OF
CONTRACTS § 371 (1932). An old New York case holds precisely that equity will not enforce
specific performance of an express covenant by a landlord to repair. Beck v. Allison, 56 N.Y.
366 (1874).
41. 65 Misc. 2d at 19-20, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 17. A rescission order would have actually aided
the landlord's design, thereby providing the tenant a right without an effective remedy.
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seriousness of the violations."
The appellate division of the New York Supreme Court put its
imprimatur on the implied warranty of habitability in May, 1975 in
Tonetti v. Penati.3 The court found that the presence of rats and
an unbearable, ineradicable dog odor in the leased apartment to be
a breach of the landlord's warranty of habitability which justified
rescission and a refund of the tenant's security deposit, just as ad-
vance payments for future services would be recoverable from one
who breached a contract." The court stated a logical truism which
was only beginning to apply as a legal doctrine: "The main concern
of today's tenant is that he acquire premises which he can enjoy for
living purposes; he is more mobile and generally less skilled at
maintenance than the agrarian tenant; repairs are most costly and
dwellings, with modem plumbing and electrical facilities, are more
complex."45
B. New York's Statutory Remedies
In addition to the development of common law principles in the
courts, tenants have had available a variety of remedial paths in
administrative regulations and statutory enactments. The housing
code 6 has served well as a tool for measuring defects and the overall
quality of conditions for the purposes of evidence and the computa-
tion of appropriate damages." However, the original sole reliance on
administrative proceedings and civil and criminal fines and penal-
ties has been a well-documented failure. 8
Second, under section 302-a of the Multiple Dwelling Law, gov-
erning "rent-impairing violations," a tenant need not pay any rent
if the landlord has been on formal notice of a serious violation of the
42. Id. at 22, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 19. Accord, Jackson v. Rivera, 65 Misc. 2d 468, 318 N.Y.S.2d
7 (Civ. Ct. 1971)(where violations included rat holes and broken toilets).
43. 48 A.D.2d 25, 367 N.Y.S.2d 804 (2d Dep't 1975).
44. Id. at 30, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 808.
45. Id. at 29, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 807.
46. NEw YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE ch. 26, tit. D (1977 & Supp. 1978).
47. See, e.g., Morbeth Realty Corp. v. Velez, 73 Misc. 2d 996, 343 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Civ. Ct.
1973); Mannie Joseph, Inc. v. Stewart, 71 Misc. 2d 160, 335 N.Y.S.2d 709 (Civ. Ct. 1972);
Morbeth Realty Corp. v. Rosenshine, 67 Misc. 2d 325, 323 N.Y.S.2d 363 (Civ. Ct. 1971);
Amanuensis, Ltd. v. Brown, 65 Misc. 2d 15, 318 N.Y.S.2d 11 (Civ. Ct. 1971); Jackson v.
Rivera, 65 Misc. 2d 468, 318 N.Y.S.2d 7 (Civ. Ct. 1971).
48. Gribetz & Grad, Housing Code Enforcement: Sanctions and Remedies, 66 COLUM. L.
REv. 1254 (1966).
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housing code for longer than six months." The Division of Code
Enforcement is charged with promulgating a list of "rent-
impairing" violations by means of a complex procedure prescribed
by the legislature A0 The availability of this remedy ought to give the
landlord the impetus to correct serious problems. However, the six-
month waiting period necessarily obstructs quick remedies to situa-
tions which frequently require immediate attention. Furthermore,
two procedural aspects are disadvantageous to the tenant. First, the
tenant must affirmatively plead and prove the facts that trigger the
statute; second, he must deposit rent claimed by the landlord with
the clerk of the court.' The party proving his allegations of fact
recovers the entire amount so deposited." The tenant cannot re-
claim any amount he may have paid before invoking the section."'
Section 755 of the Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law
provides a two-part defense for tenants against a landlord's action
where the Division of Code Enforcement or another administrative
agency has issued an order to correct a code violation.5" Under these
circumstances, the tenant may obtain a stay of proceedings to dis-
possess. Under this section, there is no need for the Division of Code
Enforcement to make a formal finding of a "rent-impairing" viola-
tion, but the court must deem the condition to be a constructive
49. N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 302-a(3)(a) (McKinney 1974). The section applies in cities
with populations of 400,000 or more. Id. § 302-a(1). A nearly identical provision applies for
smaller cities and towns and villages. N.Y. MULT. REs. LAW § 305-a (McKinney Supp. 1979).
50. Id. § 302-a(2). The Department of Housing Preservation and Development, at the
time of promulgation of lists of violations of the housing code (see note 46 supra and accompa-
nying text), indicates which of those violations it proposes to call "rent-impairing" for pur-
poses of section 302-a. Within thirty days the department must hold a public hearing on the
propriety of the designation of the particular violations as "rent-impairing." There are provi-
sions for publication of the resulting list of rent-impairing violations. Up to four months after
the hearing any interested party may seek review by the state supreme court of any classifica-
tion of a code violation as "rent-impairing." Id. § 302-a(2)(c). The sweep of section 302-a was
held to be a constitutional exercise of the state's police power. Ten W. 28th St. Realty Corp.
v. Moerdler, 52 Misc. 2d 109, 275 N.Y.S.2d 144 (Sup. Ct. 1966). Examples of rent-impairing
violations are: insufficient water supply (NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE § D26-15.01 (1978)),
defective fire egress (Id. § D26-10.01, 10.05), rodents (Id. § D26-13.03), inadequate hot water
(Id. § D26-17.07), inadequate heating (Id. § D26-17.03), and poor lighting for halls and
stairways (Id. § D26-19.03).
51. N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 302-a(3)(c) (McKinney 1974).
52. Id.
53. Id. § 302-a(3)(d).
54. N.Y. REAL PRoP. AcTs. LAW § 755 (McKinney 1979).
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eviction or to be dangerous to life, health or safety.55 Even given the
foregoing facts, the tenant must pay the rent, as it comes due, into
court. " The statute provides that the court (or agency) disburse
portions of the escrowed money for repairs." If the landlord complies
with the order to correct the violations the stay is vacated and that
amount not used for repairs is paid to the landlord."
This remedy is not fully satisfactory to the tenant because he
ultimately pays the full rent provided for in the lease. Usually there
is no abatement based on cut-off of services and the consequent
decline in the value of what he has contracted for in the lease."5 Even
if the tenant attains his most important immediate goal, the repair
of dangerous or otherwise annoying conditions, he is not fully com-
pensated when he receives nothing in exchange for the diminution
in value of his leasehold during the period before judicial interven-
tion. Only in the most extraordinary circumstances will a tenant
recover any money. For example, in Ellabee Realty Corp. v. Beach,"'
where the landlord instituted nonpayment summary proceedings,
the tenant interposed as an affirmative defense allegations of nu-
merous housing code violations, including lack of heat and hot
water, broken windows, leaks in the walls, defective light fixtures,
and a broken mail box." Pursuant to section 755, all rent due had
been ordered to be paid into court and released to the landlord upon
his restoration of suitable living conditions in the building; but the
court here held that since the landlord failed to perform within two
years after the first deposit into court, the tenant was entitled to a
full return of the sum of the deposits made into court.2
55. Id. § 755(1)(a).
56. Id. § 755(2).
57. Id. § 755(3).
58. Id.
59. See Quinn & Phillips, The Law of Landlord-Tenant: A Critical Evaluation of the Past
with Guidelines for the Future, 38 FORDHAM L. REv. 225, 242-49 (1969), for criticism of section
755.
60. 72 Misc. 2d 658, 340 N.Y.S.2d 8 (Civ. Ct. 1972).
61. Id. at 659, 340 N.Y.S.2d at 8-9.
62. Id. at 660, 340 N.Y.S.2d at 10. Similarly, in B.L.H. Realty Corp. v. Cruz, 87 Misc. 2d
258, 383 N.Y.S.2d 781 (App. Term, 1st Dep't 1975), the tenant in a nonpayment summary
proceeding obtained a section 755 stay of proceedings, citing violations in the building where
he lived, and duly deposited his monthly rent into court. When the landlord failed to take
any action on needed repairs for three years after the issuance of the stay, the court allowed
the tenant to recoup one-half of the deposits as a set-off, reflecting damages for the breach
of the warranty of habitability. Id.
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In like manner, the rules applying to rent-controlled and rent-
stabilized apartments set up clear standards for weighing the seri-
ousness of tenants' complaints." Although rent control and rent
stabilization rules obviously do not apply to cooperators, the re-
quirements under these systems that apartment dwellers receive
certain minimum services and that they not be given less service
than they originally bargained for can validly be analogized to the
condition of cooperators.
Both sections 302-a and 755 should be workable for the cooperator
who is persistent in getting the proper administrative inspections
and is willing to suffer the sections' built-in delays. Yet, neither
statute can be considered a completely satisfactory means of obtain-
ing recompense for loss of bargained-for services."
C. The Implied Warranty of Habitability
The broadest remedies applied in New York come under the aegis
of the statutory warranty of habitability.65 The language of the stat-
63. Rent control and rent stabilization are two related systems of controlling tenants'
housing costs in the tight New York City market. Tenants who come under rent control laws
are entitled to certain "essential services," which usually include all those services present
at the "freeze" date of the law, April 20, 1962. Landlords are entitled to moderate periodic
increases in rent formulated by the Office of Rent Control, a government agency. N.Y.
UNCONSOL. LAWS §§ 8601-8617 (McKinney 1974); 1962 N.Y.C. Local Laws No. 20; NEW YORK,
N.Y. ADMIN. CODE §§ Y51-1.0 to Y51-18.0 (1975). Rent-stabilized tenants are entitled to
periodic lease renewals at rent increases established by the Rent Stabilization Association, a
self-regulatory landlord body, and the continuation of designated "required services" agreed
upon by the Association. 1969 N.Y.C. Local Laws No. 16; NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE §§
YY51-1.0 to YY51-7.0 (1975). See generally Comment, Emergency Tenant Protection in New
York: Ten Years of Rent Stabilization, 7 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 305 (1979).
64. See notes 51-53, 59 supra and accompanying text.
65. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 235-b (McKinney Supp. 1978):
1. In every written or oral lease or rental agreement for residential premises the
landlord or lessor shall be deemed to convenant and warrant that the premises so
leased or rented and all areas used in connection therewith in common with other
tenants or residents are fit for human habitation and for the uses reasonably intended
by the partiesand that the occupants of such premises shall not be subjected to any
conditions which would be dangerous, hazardous or detrimental to their life, health or
safety. When any such condition has been caused by the misconduct of the tenant or
lessee or persons under his direction or control, it shall not constitute a breach of such
covenants and warranties.
2. Any agreement by a lessee or tenant of a dwelling waiving or modifying his rights
as set forth in this section shall be void as contrary to public policy.
3. In determining the amount of damages sustained by a tenant as a result of a
19801 COOPERATIVE APARTMENTS 355
ute makes no reference to what remedies are available to a tenant
in the event of the landlord's breach of this convenant. The courts
have acted on the theory that after the legislature creates or en-
dorses a substantive right without specific remedial provisions in
the statute, it is the judiciary which must devise the corresponding
procedures and remedies." Specifically, the housing part of New
York City's Civil Court, established by the Housing Court Law of
1972,11 is empowered to take and employ any available legal or equi-
table remedies." Senator Barclay, the sponsor of the warranty of
habitability law in the New York Legislature, asserted that the
statutory enactment would "confirm the direction that the courts
have been taking toward dealing with the question on the basis of
contract law."" Therefore, the statute has been recognized as a
breach of the warranty set forth in this section, the court need not require any expert
testimony.
The proposed UNIFORM RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT AcT (1972 version) [hereinafter
cited as URLTA] appears to include an unstated warranty of habitability. Article 2 of the
URLTA puts the burden of apartment maintenance on the landlord. URLTA § 2.104. Upon
landlord's failure to perform, a tenant could avail himself of all contract-type strategies,
including "repair and deduct," claim for damages for diminution in value, and the defense
of landlord's breach in actions for rent or possession. Id. §§ 4.101-4.105. The URLTA has been
substantially adopted as law in 13 states. See 7A U.L.A. 17 (West Supp. 1979).
66. Houston Realty Corp. v. Castro, 94 Misc. 2d 115, 116-18, 404 N.Y.S.2d 796, 797-98
(Civ. Ct. 1978) (citing Shaw, New Law of Implied Warranty of Habitability, N.Y.L.J., Sept.
2, 1975, at 1, col. 2).
67. 1972 N.Y. Laws ch. 982 (codified in N.Y. CITY CIV. CT. AcT §§ 101-2300 (McKinney
1963 & Supp. 1979)).
68. Housing Court Law § 1(b) (codified in N.Y. CITY CIv. CT. AcT § 110 (McKinney Supp.
1979)). The court also may impose civil fines for violations. See generally Note, The New York
City Civil Housing Court: Consolidation of Old and New Remedies, 47 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
483 (1973). Furthermore, it is clear that lower-level housing courts statewide will hear and
decide all issues and legal theories in a summary proceeding hearing: "Piecemeal determina-
tion of issues [is] wholly repugnant to the law. . . .All aspects of the Summary Proceeding
should be litigated at one time." Bianchi v. Ficoratto, 83 Misc. 2d 996, 998, 373 N.Y.S.2d
946, 948 (City Ct. White Plains 1975). Alternatively, it is suggested that a tenant may bring
his complaint to the small claims part of the civil court to recover his costs of making repairs,
or presumably even the diminution in value of the apartment, up to the small claims limit
of $1,000. J. STRIKER & A. SHAPIRO, SUPER TENANT 228-32 (2d ed. 1978); Driscoll, De Minimis
Curat Lex-Small Claims Court, 2 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 479, 486 (1974).
69. 1975 N.Y. SEN. J. 7766-76. A logical extrapolation of the meaning of the statute states:
"[leases] call for mutual obligations; they differ little, if at all, from other agreements."
Posner & Gallet, Mitigation of Damages in Residential-Lease Breaches, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 5,
1978, at 1, col. 2 (citing 57 E. 54 Realty Corp. v. Gay Nineties Realty Corp., 71 Misc. 2d 353,
335 N.Y.S.2d 872 (App. Term, 1st Dep't 1972)).
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codification'" of the Amanuensis7 and Tonetti72 principles. Accord-
ingly, the lower state courts have manifested the belief that they
have been given a mandate to apply an appropriate assortment of
contract law principles to section 235-b situations.73
Subsequent to the enactment of the statute the cases have often
turned on contract principles. In Kekilas v. Saddy,7" the landlord
began a nonpayment summary proceeding to recover possession of
a leased one-family residence and to force the tenants to pay back
rent for two months. The tenant, alleging that the persistent odor
of cat urine permeated the house to the extent that his wife felt
compelled to abandon the premises after two days,"5 raised the land-
lord's breach of the implied warranty as a set-off or counterclaim.
The court stated that, hypothetically, the tenant could claim: (1)
an amount equal to the cost of undertaking repairs himself; (2) an
amount representing the difference between the agreed rental price
and actual value of the premises in disrepair; or (3) the sum of these
two amounts." In Pantalis v. Archer,7" for example, the tenant re-
70. Covington v. McKeiver, 88 Misc. 2d 1000, 390 N.Y.S.2d 502 (App. Term, 2d Dep't
1976); Kekllas v. Saddy, 389 N.Y.S.2d 756 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1976).
71. See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
72. See note 43 supra and accompanying text. One commentator, after reviewing the old
conveyance concept of residential leasing, posited that contractual remedies, including abate-
ment of rent, were implicitly approved by the passage of the statute; the author reasoned that
section 235-b was a codification of Tonetti except that the statute offers more tenant protec-
tion in that it prohibits express waiver of the warranty in the lease. Shaw, New Law of Implied
Warranty of Habitability, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 2, 1976, at 1, col. 2.
73. See, e.g., Maryanov v. Peters, 409 N.Y.S.2d 691 (Civ. Ct. 1978) (citing Governor's
Message of Approval, 1975 N.Y. Laws ch. 597, reprinted in [1975] N.Y. LEGIS. ANN. 437);
Leris Realty Corp. v. Robbins, 95 Misc. 2d 712, 408 N.Y.S.2d 166 (Civ. Ct. 1978); Whitehouse
Estates, Inc. v. Thomson, 87 Misc. 2d 813, 386 N.Y.S.2d 733 (Civ. Ct. 1976). The New York
Court of Appeals has recognized a lease as a contract for the purposes of the statute of frauds.
That is, the landlord's signature alone on a lease is not sufficient to satisfy the statute in an
action against the tenant, but rather the lease must be signed by the party against whom it
is to be enforced. Geraci v. Jenrette, 41 N.Y.2d 660, 363 N.E.2d 559, 394 N.Y.S.2d 853 (1977).
74. 389 N.Y.S.2d 756 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1976).
75. The tenant also complained of a hot water tank leak and a gas leak in the house. Id.
76. Id. at 759. In this case, however, the tenant failed to call witnesses to testify on the
issue of decreased value, or any other element of damages, and was awarded on his counter-
claim only nominal damages of six cents. Id. at 760. During the first year of the statutory
warranty of habitability landlords urged the courts to require tenants to bring in expert
testimony to prove the fact and amount of diminution in market value of a residential
leasehold. The Legislature, soon recognizing the unrealistic logistical and financial burden
such a requirement would place on the typical tenant in an ordinary housing court action,
amended the statute to rule out the necessity of an expert witness for evidence on damages.
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covered fifty dollars in rent abatement representing a reduction in
the apartment's value because of repeated interruptions of the ten-
ant's hot water supply.7"
The most expansive approach to the warranty of habitability has
been taken in Park West Management Corp. v. Mitchell.79 In May,
1976 there was a city-wide, seventeen-day strike of apartment
building workers. Approximately 400 tenants in the 2,500-unit Park
West Village apartment development withheld their rent for the
month of June. The landlord instituted summary proceedings and
the tenants, citing a cut-off of normal building services, responded
by raising the landlord's breach of the warranty of habitability."
The parties stipulated to the fact of extensive disruption of garbage
removal and janitorial services.8' Using a formula based on rent
control regulations, a housing court judge determined that the loss
of rental value due to the interruption of services entitled the ten-
ants to a ten percent set-off with respect to their June rent." The
appellate term, the appellate division of the supreme court and the
court of appeals upheld the housing court on both the law and the
1976 N.Y. Laws ch. 837, § 1 (codified at N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 235-b(3) (McKinney Supp.
1978)).
77. 87 Misc. 2d 205, 384 N.Y.S.2d 678 (Dist. Ct. Suffolk County 1976).
78. Accord, Covington v. McKeiver, 88 Misc. 2d 1000, 390 N.Y.S.2d 502 (App. Term, 2d
Dep't 1976) (tenant was afforded rent abatement where the living conditions were
"appalling;" but he was dispossessed of the premises in favor of the landlord); Whitehouse
Estates, Inc. v. Thomson, 87 Misc. 2d 813, 386 N.Y.S.2d 733 (Civ. Ct. 1976) (tenant was
permitted by the court to deduct $100 per month for a broken air conditioner for two summer
months and $10 per month for a defective stove).
79. 47 N.Y.2d 316, 391 N.E.2d 1288, 418 N.Y.S.2d-310 (1979). Note that the extent of the
concept of "habitability" varies among the states. See Clarke, Washington's Implied War-
ranty of Habitability. Reform or Illusion?, 14 GONZ. L. REV. 1, 12-22 (1978). See also Fusco,
Collins & Birnbaum, Damages for Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability in Illinois-A
Realistic Approach, 55 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 337, 338 (1979); Note, Landlord's Liability for
Consequential Damages under an Implied Warranty of Habitability, 44 Mo. L. REV. 340, 342-
44 (1979); Note, The Implied Warranty of Habitability in Texas: A Development Long Over-
due in Texas Landlord-Tenant Law, 16 Hous. L. REV. 225 (1978).
80. 47 N.Y.2d at 326, 391 N.E.2d at 1293, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 315.
81. Id. Among the strikers were maintenance workers, doormen, and elevator operators,
Tenants in some buildings took turns themselves at these posts to assure that such positions
were filled around the clock. The situation was exacerbated by the refusal of municipal
sanitation workers to cross the building workers' picket lines to pick up the garbage. N.Y.
Times, May 10, 1976, at 55, col. 6; id., May 7, 1976, at Al, col. 6; id., May 6, 1976, at 1, col.
5; id., May 5, 1976, at 33, col. 5.
82. 47 N.Y.2d at 327, 391 N.E.2d at 1293, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 315.
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findings of fact."3
Park West is significant in terms of defining habitability and
outlining the scope of tenants' remedies. The lower appellate court
acknowledged that the doctrine of warranty of habitability evolved
in response to instances of wilful landlord nonfeasance," but stated
that a seventeen-day deprivation of all normal refuse removal and
janitorial services could create conditions sufficiently detrimental to
trigger the statute.85 Although the reason for the interruption was
beyond the landlord's control, the landlord should not necessarily
be allowed to recover the full rent. As the court indicated, contract
law excuses the performance of services by a party (here the land-
lord) prevented from acting by forces beyond his control, but he may
not receive compensation for those services he was unable to per-
form.81 In holding for the tenants, the court of appeals implicitly
adopted this position.
The court of appeals, passing favorably on the housing judge's
method of formulating the amount of rent set-off, 7 conceded the
nature of determining damages here was necessarily imprecise, but
reaffirmed the well-settled principle that where damages have been
caused by breach of contract, and there is uncertainty concerning
amount only, the aggrieved party is entitled to a recovery. 8
This all-embracing warranty of habitability theory would be ideal
for the cooperator disgruntled with faulty repair and poor mainte-
nance service in his building. Park West makes it clear that the
83. Id. at 330, 391 N.E.2d at 1295, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 317.
84. Park West Management v. Mitchell, 62 A.D.2d 291, 295, 404 N.Y.S.2d 115, 118 (1st
Dep't 1978), aff'd, 47 N.Y.2d 316, 391 N.E.2d 1288, 418 N.Y.S.2d 310 (1979).
85. Id. at 295, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 117.
86. Id. at 296, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 118.
87. 47 N.Y.2d at 329, 391 N.E.2d at 1295, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 317.
88. Id. (citing In re Rothko, 43 N.Y.2d 305, 372 N.E.2d 291, 401 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1977);
Wakeman v. Wheeler & Wilson Mfg. Co., 101 N.Y. 205, 4 N.E. 264 (1886)). See also 5 A.
CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1020 (1964); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 331, Comment b (1932).
Critics of liberal application of the implied warranty of habitability believe that it will reduce
landlords' incomes, making the undertaking of repairs impossible, encouraging landlord
abandonment of buildings, and further discouraging the construction of new housing. Note,
Leases and the Illegal Contract Theory-Judicial Reinforcement of the Housing Code, 56
GEo. L.J. 920, 937 (1968). A thorough research project in southern California, however, deter-
mined that use of the warranty is resulting in repairs of property, with little other effect on
the housing market. Heskin, The Warranty of Habitability Debate: A California Case Study,
66 CAL. L. REV. 37, 49-51 (1978).
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warranty does not speak merely to the upkeep of the bare minimum
of four walls, heat, and hot and cold running water. Apparently the
warranty covers everything the normal apartment dweller would
expect he bargained for in signing a lease. Yet, this is the one section
touching upon individual rights that has been interpreted in some
housing court proceedings as not affording the cooperator a remedy
or defense against the landlord cooperative corporation. "9
III. Cooperative Apartments
A. The Cooperative Form
The cooperative form of home owning was introduced in New
York City in the mid-nineteenth century. There was a boom in the
New York cooperative market in the prosperous 1920's; a bust fol-
lowing the Great Depression. Real acceptance of cooperatives came
only after World War II and the expansion of Federal Housing
Administration-insured loans.' The cooperative form has grown
increasingly popular in New York City in recent years. There are
now 30,000 cooperative apartments in 500 buildings in Manhattan.2
Based on the number of "conversion plans" filed by building owners
seeking to sell their buildings one unit at a time to potential tenant-
shareholders,9" it is expected that this number will double by 1982.
In a tight housing market, the cost of buying into a cooperative rose
precipitously during the mid- and late-nineteen seventies.94
89. See notes 130-33 infra and accompanying text.
90. Mutual Redevelopment v. Goldart, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 8, 1969, at 10, col. 7 (Civ. Ct.);
Miller, Cooperative Apartments: Real Estate or Securities?, 45 B.U. L. REV. 465 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as Miller].
91. Miller, supra note 90, at 465-66.
92. N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1979, § 8, at 1, col. 3.
93. A developer wishing to convert a rental building into a cooperative must file a plan
with the state department of law. The plan must provide that it is either a "non-eviction
plan," in which event existing tenants cannot be evicted merely for refusal to purchase
cooperative stock, or an "eviction plan," under which non-purchasing tenants may be evicted.
A plan is not deemed effective unless a certain percentage of the existing tenants-15% for a
non-eviction plan, 35% for an eviction plan-agree to purchase within 12 months of the filing
of the offering statement and prospectus. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 352-e, 352-eee (McKinney
1968 & Supp. 1979). See also note 152 infra. A new law gives absolute protection from
cooperative conversions to qualifying senior citizens who rent and protects all rental tenants
from coercive conduct in connection with proposed cooperative conversions. 1979 N.Y. Laws
ch. 432, § 2 (effective July 5, 1979) (codified at N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-eeee (McKinney
Supp. 1979)).
94. N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1979, § 8, at 1, col. 3. Evidently, the prices of cooperative
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A cooperative apartment is the "child of a marriage of a long-term
lease with a stock certificate." 5 In a cooperative arrangement, the
entire building is owned in fee by a corporation;" residents hold
shares in the corporation. 7 The corporate entity leases to the share-
holders apartments in the building. Each inhabitant of the building
is both a shareholder and a tenant of the corporation under a long-
term lease. 8
The right to a lease for a particular apartment requires the pur-
chase of a designated number of shares. Each apartment requires a
different number of shares, which number depends upon the size
and location (upper stories are deemed more desirable) of the apart-
ment. " In addition to the lump sum the occupant pays to obtain the
corporation's stock and the right to move into a particular apart-
ment, under the lease or occupancy agreement he must pay a
monthly charge which is commonly called a "maintenance" ex-
pense. 00 This amount is fixed every year by the board of directors
of the corporation. The amount reflects each tenant-shareholder's
pro rata share, based on percentage of stock held, of the corpora-
tion's expenditures for maintenance services, mortgage payments
and real property tax assessments. 10
Cooperators benefit by the appreciation in value of the apartment
and building without the full burden of actual ownership."0 ' The
apartments in early 1979 were routinely being bid up over asking prices as soon as they were
available. In addition to the lagging construction of new residential buildings, another prof-
fered explanation of the sharp price increases is the renewed public confidence in the future
of New York City. Hellman, Buying Real Estate: Safety in Concrete, NEW YORK, Feb. 28,
1979, at 87-88.
95. Isaacs, "To Buy or Not to Buy: That is the Question" ... What is a Cooperative
Apartment?, 13 THE RECORD 203, 208 (1958) (cited in Miller, supra note 90, at 474).
96. Carden Hall, Inc. v. George, 56 Misc. 2d 865, 868, 290 N.Y.S.2d 430, 433 (Sup. Ct.
1968); 15A AM. JUR. 2d, Condominiums & Co-operative Apartments § 59, at 889 (1976).
97. 15A AM. JUR. 2d, Condominiums & Co-operative Apartments § 59, at 889 (1976).
98. 4B R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 633.4, at 781-82 (rev. ed. P. Rohan 1978) [hereinafter
cited as R. POWELL]; Anderson, Cooperative Apartments in Florida: A Legal Analysis, 12 U.
MIAMI L. REV, 13, 40 (1957).
99. See, e.g., C. GOLDSTEIN, L. KASTER & P. ROHAN, COOPERATIVES AND CONDOMINIUMs 466-
76 (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as GOLDSTEIN].
100. 4B R. POWELL, supra note 98, 633.4, at 784; N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1979, § 8, at 1,
col. 3.
101. 4B R. POWELL, supra note 98, 633.4, at 784; Teitelbaum, Representing the Pur-
chaser of a Cooperative Apartment, 45 ILL. B.J. 420, 421-22 (1957).
102. Castle, Legal Phases of Co-operative Buildings, 2 So. CAL. L. REV. 1, 2 (1928);
Annot., Co-operative Apartment-Stock Rights, 99 A.L.R.2d 236, 237 (1965).
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mortgage payments for the building and all real property taxes are
paid by the corporation. The corporation is responsible for manage-
ment and therefore the risk of personal liability is reduced for each
individual. Individual savings are significantly increased by ratable
apportionment of costs.'03 Share transfer restrictions and lease cove-
nants prohibiting assignment and subletting give occupants the
ability to select those who may move into the building.'"4 Further-
more, stock ownership in the building gives the occupants the op-
portunity to make and enforce rules applicable throughout the
building. 05
The relationship of the cooperative corporation and the tenant-
shareholder is to be determined from reading together the original
plan of organization of the cooperative arrangement, the prospectus
under which the stock was offered, the stock subscription agree-
ment, the proprietary lease (or "occupancy agreement," if so desig-
nated), the certificate of incorporation and by-laws of the corpora-
tion, and the "house rules" (provided of course, that none of these
provisions are contrary to law). 106 Usually, these legal instruments
are deemed to form a single contract between the cooperative corpo-
ration and the individual cooperator.' The recently acknowledged
essence of a modern landlord-tenant relationship, the quid pro quo
of rental payments in exchange for maintenance of livable housing,
might be ignored by a court construing this contract.' 8
103. 4B R. POWELL, supra note 98, 632, at 767.
104. Id. 633.13, at 822, 633.14, at 825-26.2. Approval by a cooperative's governing
board is required for any sale, and such approval is not given automatically. Recently, for
example, former President Richard Nixon either withdrew voluntarily or was denied approval
to purchase a cooperative interest in an apartment on Manhattan's Upper East Side after
the present residents of the building publicly voiced their unwillingness to accept the security
problems, the press and curiosity seekers that would accompany the Nixons' presence there.
N.Y. Daily News, Aug. 3, 1979, at 4, col. 4; id., Aug. 1, 1979, at 5, col. 4.
105. 4B R. POWELL, supra note 98, 632, at 767. See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 99, at
280-84. A condominium arrangement differs from a cooperative in that a condominium occu-
pant purchases his dwelling unit in fee and is therefore individually liable for mortgage and
tax payments. 4B R. POWELL, supra note 98, 633.1, at 773-75. The association of owners is
responsible only for common areas in the condominium development. See White v. Cox, 17
Cal. App. 3d 824, 95 Cal. Rptr. 259, 45 A.L.R.3d 1161 (1971) and cases cited therein.
106. In re Miller, 173 Misc. 347, 18 N.Y.S.2d 59 (Sup. Ct. 1940); Tompkins v. Hale, 172
Misc. 1071, 15 N.Y.S.2d 854 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
107. See, e.g., Dunbar Apartments, Inc. v. Nelson, 136 Misc. 561, 241 N.Y.S. 354 (Mun.
Ct. 1930).
108. See notes 130-33 infra and accompanying text.
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B. The Legal Interest of a Cooperator
The cooperator's legal interest may be deemed to be one in per-
sonal or real property. If it is deemed to be an interest in real prop-
erty, it may be characterized as a fee or tenancy. Which of these
legal interests will be recognized depends upon the purpose of the
analysis.
The tax laws treat the cooperator as a homeowner with respect to
deductions he may take on his income tax in proportion to his con-
tribution to the cooperative's mortgage interest payments and real
property tax assessments.'"0 The tax laws in effect ignore the share-
holding aspect of the cooperative arrangement and designate the
cooperator's interest exclusively a real property interest, an interest
equivalent to that of a fee owner.1's
For purposes of federal securities regulations, the cooperative
stock is treated as a real property interest. In United Housing Foun-
dation, Inc. v. Forman,"' the United States Supreme Court held
that shares of a housing cooperative were not subject to the Securi-
ties Act of 193312 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934."11 Tenant-
shareholders alleged violations of the securities laws in the sale of
shares of Co-op City, a publicly financed project which was subject
to strict state review at each phase of its development."' Within this
project the cooperative corporation had the first right to buy back
a cooperator's stock at the original purchase price. If the cooperative
corporation did not buy back the stock (an unlikely circumstance)
the selling price to a third party was expressly limited, so that the
price originally paid for the stock was, in effect, a recoverable de-
posit. ' 5 The Court ruled against the tenant-shareholders, relying in
part on the fact that the stock could not appreciate in value and a
shareholder could never realize a profit."6 This reasoning implied
109. I.R.C. § 216(a); N.Y. TAx LAW § 360(12) (McKinney 1975). Additionally, a sale of
cooperative apartment stock is eligible for the rollover of gain upon sale of a principal resi-
dence (I.R.C. § 1034(f)), and the one-time exclusion of gain upon the sale of a principal
residence by individuals over 55 years of age (I.R.C. § 121(d)(3)).
110. Lacaille v. Feldman, 44 Misc. 2d 370, 386, 253 N.Y.S.2d 937, 955 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
111. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
112. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976).
113. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj (1976).
114. 421 U.S. at 841.
115. Id. at 842-43.
116. Id. at 851.
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that a wholly private cooperative market in which people buy and
sell, at least in part, for the purpose of actual monetary profit could
come within the purview of the securities law."7 The Second Circuit,
however, has now held the public/private distinction immaterial."8
If the Second Circuit decision is followed, the purchase and sale of
any cooperative stock will be deemed a real estate transaction."9
The overriding rationale is that the cooperator is not making an
investment in stock in the traditional sense of buying a share in
General Motors. Rather, he is buying himself a place to live. In this
sense, federal law considers a cooperative to be real property.
In contrast, state courts have called cooperative shares
"personalty" where priorities of lienors, judgment creditors and
other creditors were at issue.'20 In one case, in determining damages
for breach of contract for sale of shares in a cooperative building,
the shares were denominated "goods" covered by Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code.'2 ' Similarly, in federal court, coopera-
tive shares were held to be incorporeal personalty, for the purpose
of exempting them from the President's Phase I price controls in
1973.12 On the other hand, for the purposes of the statute of frauds,
the cooperative sale is treated as a real estate transaction.' 3
C. Duty to Maintain and Repair
The cases are less illuminating on the issue of the cooperator's
status with regard to the kind of service a tenant wants and expects
in his building. As we have seen, the relationship between the corpo-
117. E.g., 1050 Tenants Corp. v. Jakobson, 503 F.2d 1375, 1378 (2d Cir. 1974).
118. Grenader v. Spitz, 537 F.2d 612 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1009 (1976).
119. 421 U.S. at 842.
120. State Tax Comm'n v. Shor, 43 N.Y.2d 151, 371 N.E.2d 523, 400 N.Y.S.2d 805 (1977).
121. Silverman v. Alcoa Plaza Assocs., 37 A.D.2d 166, 323 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1st Dep't 1971).
The case involved default by the buyer of cooperative shares soon after he had made a down
payment pursuant to the contract of sale. The seller subsequently sold the shares to a third
party at the original contract price; i.e., the seller suffered no loss of his bargain. The default-
ing buyer sought to regain his down payment. A defaulting party has no right to recover a
down payment on a real property transaction (Cohen v. Kranz, 12 N.Y.2d 242, 189 N.E.2d
473, 238 N.Y.S.2d 928. (1963)). However, here the court characterized the shares as per-
sonalty and the defaulting buyer was allowed to recover. 37 A.D.2d at 172, 323 N.Y.S.2d at
45. The court looked to the intentions of the parties to determine the nature of the contract.
Id. at 171-72, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 44.
122. Stockton v. Lucas, 482 F.2d 979 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1973) (interpreting Eco-
nomic Stabilization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-379, §§ 201-206, 84 Stat. 796).
123. Frank v. Rubin, 59 Misc. 2d 796, 300 N.Y.S.2d 273 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
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ration and cooperator is considered that of landlord-tenant for the
purpose of the corporation's bringing an eviction proceeding against
the cooperator in housing court.'24
One housing court case, in dicta, recognized a legal duty in the
cooperative corporation in its capacity as landlord to keep all parts
of the building in good repair. The repair problem in that case,
however, was outside the leased premises.'25
Neither the language nor the legislative history of section 235-b
suggest the exception of cooperative apartments from the scope of
the warranty of habitability.2 ' A cooperator seeking the protection
of the statute ought to be able to rely on the express statement that
the statute embraces "every written or oral lease or rental agree-
ment for residential purposes."'27 Cooperators in city apartments
are presumably more like other urban apartment dwellers than sub-
urban or rural homeowners in that cooperators expect a certain
amount of building maintenance to be done by the corporation. The
physical structure of an apartment building makes this expectation
reasonable. Few individuals, whether cooperators or renters, would
have the expertise or resources to perform work on the normally
complex apartment building facilities.' 8
Thus far, however, it appears that the courts perceive cooperators
as having the protection of more detailed agreements and greater
124. 930 Fifth Ave. Corp. v. King, 40 A.D.2d 140, 338 N.Y.S.2d 773 (1st Dep't 1972);
Hilltop Village Coop. #4 Inc. v. Goldstein, 43 Misc. 2d 657, 252 N.Y.S.2d 7 (App. Term, 2d
Dep't 1964), aff'd, 258 N.Y.S.2d 348 (App. Div., 2d Dep't 1965); Chinatown Apartments, Inc.
v. Chu Cholam, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 29, 1979, at 7, col. 1 (App. Term, 1st Dep't); 1990 Seventh
Ave. Coop. v. Edwards, 133 Misc. 831, 234 N.Y.S. 82 (App. Term, 1st Dep't 1929); Esplanade
Gardens, Inc. v. Reed, N.Y.L.J., May 9, 1979, at 13, col. 3 (Civ. Ct.); Susskind v. 1136 Ten-
ants Corp., 43 Misc. 2d 588, 251 N.Y.S.2d 321 (Civ. Ct. 1964); Brigham Park Coop. Apts.,
Sec. 4 v. Lieberman, 158 N.Y.S.2d 135 (Mun. Ct. 1956); Dunbar Apartments, Inc. v. Nelson,
136 Misc. 561, 241 N.Y.S. 354 (Mun. Ct. 1930). Contra, Earl W. Jimerson Housing Co. v.
Butler, 97 Misc. 2d 563, 412 N.Y.S.2d 560 (Civ. Ct. 1979). But the corporation cannot
bring a nonpayment summary proceeding for an amount allegedly due that represents a
credit applicable to the purchase price of the cooperative stock. Adair v. Tookey, 417
N.Y.S.2d 185 (Civ. Ct. 1979).
125. Susskind v. 1136 Tenants Corp., 43 Misc. 2d 588, 251 N.Y.S.2d 321 (Civ. Ct. 1964).
The reasoning behind the finding of a duty in this case has not been followed by other courts,
however.
126. See 1975 N.Y. SEN. J. 7766-76; Governor's Message of Approval, 1975 N.Y. Laws ch.
597, reprinted in [1975] N.Y. LEGIS. ANN. 437.
127. See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 235-b(1) (McKinney Supp. 1979).
128. See text accompanying note 45 supra.
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bargaining power, and therefore require less judicial protection than
do the generally less affluent urban tenants who are faced with
uniform leases and a tight housing market.'29 In 320-E. 57th Corp.
v. DeLulio,'30 the housing part of the civil court held that the war-
ranty of habitability did not apply to an occupancy agreement for
an apartment in a cooperative building. The cooperative corpora-
tion in this case brought nonpayment summary proceedings after
DeLulio had failed to pay her monthly "maintenance" charges for
several months. DeLulio sought to interpose the defense of breach
of implied warranty of habitability. She claimed that, despite her
numerous requests, the corporation had failed to fix a portion of the
roof in need of substantial repair, with the result that her interior
walls and her personal property were damaged. DeLulio also pre-
sented to the court evidence of other housing code violations found
by the Division of Code Enforcement of the New York City Office
of Rent and Housing Maintenance. In dismissing DeLulio's defense
the court relied on an earlier decision, 158th Street Riverside Drive
Co. v. Launay, which reads, in pertinent part: 3'
While section 235(b) [sic] refers to "every written or oral lease or rental
agreement for residential premises" and similarly refers to "landlord or les-
sor" and "tenants or residents," it is clear that the conventional landlord-
tenant relationship is contemplated. . . . Accordingly, this court holds that
because a cooperative corporation does not stand in the conventional rela-
tionship of landlord to its member tenants, the provisions of section 235(b)
of the Real Property Law do not apply to such relationship. Respondent's
remedy lies elsewhere.
The factual setting in Hauptman v. 222 E. 80th St. Corp.'32 was
nearly identical to DeLulio except that Hauptman had the needed
repairs done at his own expense. But here the housing judge, citing
the warranty of habitability, upheld Hauptman's claim against the
corporation for the cost of repairs. This decision is in direct conflict
with DeLulio and Launay. Note, though, that Hauptman was dis-
tinguishable in that the housing judge was presented with strong,
clear language from the cooperator's lease concerning the corpora-
129. N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1979, at B1, col. 1.
130. No. 59269/78 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct., Jan. 10, 1979).
131. 158th Street Riverside Drive Co. v. Launay, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 6, 1976, at 9, col. 2 (Civ.
Ct.).
132. 418 N.Y.S.2d 728 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1979).
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tion's duty to maintain structural portions of the building. The
Hauptman court also made a finding of fault in the original con-
struction of the building.'33 Applying the implied warranty only to
conventional tenants may not be a valid policy decision on the basis
of their perceived higher bargaining power, since the market for
cooperatives has also become highly competitive and a prospective
cooperator's bargaining position is generally weak.' 4
IV. Proposed Corporate Law Strategies
It is presently unclear whether the cooperator stands in the posi-
tion of a modern tenant with respect to his status vis-a-vis the
cooperative corporation. He may therefore need to rely, if not on
explicit provisions of his contract with the corporation, on proce-
dures made available by the fact of a cooperative's corporate form.
When confronted with a dissatisfied cooperator the courts some-
times indicate that the cooperator's primary forum is the board
meeting and that the cooperator's best tool is his vote in contesting
directors' elections.'35 Apparently, the prevailing attitude in such
courts is that those in a "cooperative" ought to be true to their name
by being cooperative in the sense of heeding each other's individual
complaints so that litigation in quest of tenant-type remedies
should be unnecessary.' 36
In New York the mechanism of the law of business corporations
generally applies to cooperatives.' 37 The management of a coopera-
tive corporation is entrusted to its directors and officers.' 3 The
shareholders' voting procedure is not necessarily the same as in the
usual corporation. Each cooperator is allotted one vote, rather than
133. Id.
134. N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1979, § 8, at 1, col. 3; Hellman, Buying Real Estate: Safety in
Concrete, NEW YORK, Feb. 28, 1979, at 87-88.
135. Russell v. Third Equity Owners Corp., 67 A.D.2d 869, 870, 413 N.Y.S.2d 392, 393
(1st Dep't 1979); Bourgeois v. Am. Savings Bank, 63 Misc. 2d 468, 469-70, 312 N.Y.S.2d 232,
233-34 (Civ. Ct. 1970).
136. 67 A.D.2d at 870, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 393.
137. Jamil v. Southridge Coop., Sec. 4, Inc., 93 Misc. 2d 383, 385, 402 N.Y.S.2d 292, 293
(Civ. Ct. 1978).
138. The Business Corporation Law applies to all phases of cooperative corporation opera-
tion except where expressly stated otherwise. N.Y. Coop. CORP. LAW § 5 (McKinney Supp.
1979). Such application of laws designed for general business use arguably makes an awkward
fit. Hennessey, Cooperative Apartments and Town Houses, 1956 U. ILL. L.F. 22, 40-41.
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a portion based on percentage of total share ownership,"9 unless
voting according to proportionate patronage or shares in the cooper-
ative is expressly provided for.4 0 The New York Cooperative Corpo-
ration Law provides shareholders can remove a director by a vote
of three-quarters of those present at a meeting where merely ten
percent of those entitled to vote are present.'4 ' Conceivably, a
small group of cooperators united by a common problem, for ex-
ample, all the people on the leaky top floor, could bring about a
change in board membership.
The board of directors has the usual corporate authority but coop-
erative shareholders are in a better position than shareholders of
businesses to determine specific policies in that they actually live
with the consequences of board actions and can readily determine
the effectiveness of these actions; also, the number of shareholders
is usually lower than that of a large corporation, so that as a practi-
cal matter it may be easier to hear the suggestions of all sharehold-
ers. Cooperators may therefore insist on more frequent shareholder
meetings and assert more control over the board than business
shareholders do. 42
Failure to provide adequate maintenance and repair services ar-
guably constitutes the kind of inaction or mismanagement for which
corporate directors and officers may be held liable, either as a
breach of the duty of care owed to the corporation or as a breach of
fiduciary duty. The directors are bound to manage the affairs of the
corporation so as to achieve its purposes efficiently and to treat
individual cooperators fairly and equally.' The duty owed by all
corporate directors and officers is to exercise "that degree of care
which an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use
under similar circumstances."'4 4 This duty comprises obligations of
139. N.Y. CooP. CORP. LAW § 44 (McKinney 1951 & Supp. 1979).
140. Id. §§ 45-46. At least five directors must be chosen, at least one of whom is both a
United States citizen and a New York State resident. Id. § 11(9).
141. Id. § 63.
142. Yourman, Some Legal Aspects of Cooperative Housing, 12 L. & CONTEMP. PROB.
126-133 (1947).
143. Vernon Manor Co-op Apartments v. Salatine, 15 Misc. 2d 491, 495, 178 N.Y.S.2d 895,
900-01 (Westchester County Ct. 1958). The court in this case found a board-imposed late
charge for nonpayment of a small supplementary charge unreasonable and unenforceable. Id.
at 496-97, 178 N.Y.S.2d at 902.
144. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 715 (officers), 717 (directors) (McKinney 1963 & Supp.
1979).
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due care and diligence in addition to the obvious constraints against
self-dealing. I5 Liability, however, may not be grounded on mere
misjudgment. 4 ' Generally, decisions of policy are left to the direc-
tors' sole discretion to the extent these decisions are reached in an
honest and good faith manner."7 An aggrieved cooperator could as-
sert that the primary purpose of the corporation is to preserve or
upgrade the physical condition of the building at the lowest possible
cost, thereby enhancing the value of the cooperators' investment.
Failure to provide adequate maintenance and repair services could
be an actionable breach of the directors' duty to protect that value.
The directors stand in the position of fiduciaries to the coopera-
tive corporation. This rule imposes a high standard"' on their be-
havior in their interactions with the corporation and with sharehold-
ers. An allegation of breach of fiduciary duty could be a proper
attack against a board member or an officer who deprives a coopera-
tor or group of cooperators of some service or repair job, so that he
himself is better served by the cooperative's resources; for example,
if a director's apartment or hallway were to benefit by substantial
alterations while other parts of the building deteriorated. A recent
case, however, suggests that a cooperator's case based on breach of
fiduciary duty requires a factual background more serious than
mere inconvenience to the cooperator, or alternatively requires
allegations of conspiracy by defendant directors to deprive plaintiff
cooperators of their rights."9
Removal of directors and officers who ill serve the corporation is
a remedy prescribed in the statute. A petition to the court to con-
sider removal of a director or officer requires the participation of
only ten percent of the shareholders. In cases of the corporate offi-
cials' neglect of legal duties, the attorney general can bring a similar
action even without a minimum number of complaining sharehold-
145. Barr v. Wackman, 36 N.Y.2d 371, 329 N.E.2d 180, 368 N.Y.S.2d 497 (1975).
146. Chelrob, Inc. v. Barrett, 293 N.Y. 442, 57 N.E.2d 825 (1944); Kamin v. Am. Express
Co., 86 Misc. 2d 809, 383 N.Y.S.2d 807 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 54 A.D.2d 654, 387 N.Y.S.2d 993
(1st Dep't 1976).
147. Blaustein v. Pan Am. Petroleum & Transp. Co., 293 N.Y. 281, 56 N.E.2d 705, motion
denied, 293 N.Y. 763, 57 N.E.2d 841 (1944).
148. See Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928).
149. Russell v. Third Equity Owners Corp., 67 A.D.2d 869, 870, 413 N.Y.S.2d 392, 393
(1st Dep't 1979).
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ers. 5t' As in any corporation, this remedial path would be open to
cooperative tenant-shareholders.
Another route may be followed through the office of the attorney
general under a section of the state's blue sky law. Unlike the federal
securities law in its scope,'5 ' New York's Martin Act specifically
provides for regulation of cooperative housing stock.' The prospec-
tive buyer is protected by provisions for full disclosure by the coop-
erative developer and by the required establishment of an escrow
account in which his money is held until he takes possession of the
apartment.'5 3 The law can be enforced by the attorney general or by
the individual in a civil suit.'5 ' Unfortunately for the cooperator,
there is nothing the attorney general can do to help a cooperator who
has settled into an apartment, absent an allegation of fraud or mis-
representation as to matters that must be included in the offering
statement.'5
V. Conclusion
Logically, the cooperator who is subject to summary proceeding
and the other mechanisms of landlord-tenant court should have
recourse to pro-tenant provisions of the law, including the broad
warranty of habitability. He is not yet assured, however, of possess-
ing these protections. 5 ' Remedies within the corporate framework
appear impracticable. There appears to be no principled reason why
tenant-shareholders should not have available this full panoply of
statutory defenses in the housing court proceedings, in view of the
fact that cooperative corporations have full right to assert the same
150. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 706 (directors), 716 (officers) (McKinney 1963 & Supp.
1979).
151. See notes 111-19 supra and accompanying text.
152. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 352-e(1)(a), 352-ee (McKinney 1968 & Supp. 1979). The
cooperative conversion section has been renumbered 352-eee. 1979 N.Y. LAWS ch. 135, § 1
(effective May 24, 1979).
153. N'Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-e(2-b) (McKinney Supp. 1979).
154. Steingart v. 21 Assocs., Inc., 31 Misc. 2d 212, 215, 220 N.Y.S.2d 276, 279 (Sup. Ct.
1961). The attorney general's administrative actions under the statute are subject to judicial
review, pursuant to Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules. 160 W. 87th St. Corp. v.
Lefkowitz, 76 Misc. 2d 297, 350 N.Y.S.2d 957 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
155. Examples of items that must be in the prospectus are: essential terms of all mort-
gages, names and business background of the principals involved, the interests and profits of
the promoters, all transfer restrictions, and a description of all major current leases. N.Y.
GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-e(1)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1979).
156. See notes 130-33 supra and accompanying text.
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claims available in any other landlord and tenant case. Otherwise,
if the tenant-shareholder is not permitted all the contemporary ten-
ant's defenses, the corporation should not be permitted to use the
expedited landlords' procedure."'
The warranty of habitability would be the most effective lever for
an individual cooperator. Certainly, the warranty should apply to
him if a literal reading of the statute is given force; it is supposed
to attach to "every written or oral lease and rental agreement for
residential purposes."'58 No legislative pronouncement tends to ex-
clude cooperative leases from the purview of the statute.
Underlying the present construction of the law which may exclude
cooperative dwellers from warranty protection may be the idea that
the predominantly middle- and upper-income cooperators do not
constitute a group that needs the type of protection that the major-
ity of apartment dwellers need. There may be the feeling that coop-
erative dwellers deal from a better position, and that they have
greater bargaining power in their housing market than poor people
have in theirs. One may contend that typical cooperative dwellers
have the advantages of: (1) greater choice of places to live, (2) law-
yers and other knowledgeable advisors, and (3) more complete and
precise documentation of their rights. As a practical matter, how-
ever, the supply in the prospective cooperator's housing market is
very small and he is not in the position to demand more explicit
statements of the corporation's responsibilities. In this respect, pro-
spective purchasers need no less protection than do lower-income
people who rent.
The problem with an analysis of the cooperator's rights is that
"cooperative housing evolved in the twilight of an era when judicial
opinions were characterized by 'pigeonholing,' a process of attach-
ing labels to the parties (or operative facts) and then reasoning with
the agreed-upon classification serving as a major premise."' 5 There
is a need for a comprehensive law which deals with every aspect of
157. This appears to be the rationale of a recent decision, Earl W. Jimerson Housing Co.
v. Butler, 97 Misc. 2d 563, 412 N.Y.S.2d 560 (Civ. Ct. 1979), which denied the cooperative
corporation recourse to summary proceeding in housing court. This decision runs contrary to
the authority of the cases cited in note 124 supra.
158. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 235-b (McKinney Supp. 1979) (emphasis added).
159. Rohan, Cooperative Housing: An Appraisal of Residential Controls and Enforcement
Procedures, 18 STAN. L. REv. 1323, 1337 (1966).
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cooperative apartment operation, as the proposed uniform condomi-
nium statute covers that kind of home ownership.6 0 Among other
things, the condominium act provides for: an implied warranty of
quality of the housing; a class action remedy for violations of the act
and of the condominium association's by-laws; recovery of punitive
damages and attorneys' fees in certain cases; and the nonenforcea-
bility of unconscionable contract terms.'
As the law now stands, counsel for a prospective cooperator ought
to ensure that the lease-or occupancy agreement defines the corpora-
tion's continued delivery of a package of services including, at least,
maintenance and repair of the roof, the exterior portion of the build-
ing, all structural portions, plumbing, heating and ventilation sys-
tems, and all common areas as a condition precedent to continued
monthly payments. The cooperator should make an express reserva-
tion of self-help remedies and rights of set-off in the event of the
corporation's failure to maintain and repair and he should attempt
to procure the corporation's waiver of its rights to proceed in sum-
mary fashion in housing court.
Damon R. Maher
160. See Thomas, The New Uniform Condominium Act, 64 A.B.A.J. 1370 (1978).
161. Id. at 1373.
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